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I went back to graduate school with the clear intention that what I wanted to do 
with my life was to improve societies, and the way to do that was to find out what 
made economies work the way they did or fail to work. I believed that once we had 
an understanding of what determined the performance of economies through time, 
we could then improve their performance. I have never lost sight of that objective.
—Douglass North, 1993
1. Introduction
The last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed amazing political and economic transformations throughout Africa, Latin America, and Eastern and Central Europe. Between 1975 and 2000 over thirty 
countries were democratized. At the same time, around 1975 a transformation 
in economic policy ideas started to challenge the post WWII Keynesian hege-
mony, and free-market economic reforms were introduced to off-set economic 
stagnation in the democratic West and to promote economic growth in the less 
developed world. The track record on this democratic politics and free market 
policy transformation has been more mixed than one might have thought given 
political theory and economic theory.
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The track record is ambiguous because while democratic politics might have 
been introduced in form, the substance of liberal rights and limits on state power 
was absent. The result has been the rise of illiberal democracy. With regard to 
economic policy, the story is also one of a disjoint between theory and prac-
tice. In this case, the market-oriented rhetoric was divorced from the reality 
of government regulation and activist policy. The IMF and the World Bank, 
for example, were formed during a Keynesian era to pursue Keynesian poli-
cies based on Keynesian economic theory. When Keynesian economic theory 
was called into question and Keynesian policies were challenged empirically, 
these Keynesian institutions were asked to pursue non-Keynesian policies. The 
so-called “Washington Consensus” emerged, which in rhetoric was supposed to 
promote worldwide free market reforms such as low inflation, balanced budgets, 
privatization, less red-tape by lowering regulation, and free trade. But in practice, 
the policies of these institutions are associated with macroeconomic stabilization, 
conditionality, and globalization. Keynesian institutions are not well consti-
tuted to pursue free market policies. Instead, what we got, even in the period of 
so-called market romanticism was simply an oscillation between “conservative” 
Keynesianism and “liberal” Keynesianism. But aggregate demand management 
remained the name of the game, and regulation and public sector programs were 
designed to address a plethora of so-called market failures. 
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, tensions over globalization and debate 
over the failure of the Washington Consensus to generate an economic growth 
miracle for the less developed economies and the reforming former socialist 
economies of the world led to an increasing disillusionment with the laissez faire 
policy rhetoric of the past generation. Just as democratic transitions without 
liberal limits on the state resulted in illiberal democracy, economic transitions 
without liberal limits on the state resulted in weak growth and frustrated popu-
lations. Whenever we discuss democratic and economic reforms, it might be 
useful to remember that we neither desire voting just for the sake of voting or 
growth just for the sake of growth, but always provide instrumental value to 
voting and economic growth in relation to the production of effective freedoms 
and life improving conditions. Freedom of press, freedom of religion, freedom of 
association, improved sanitation, greater educational opportunities, better nutri-
tion, wider-spread literacy, longer and less onerous lives: these are some of the 
things positive social change is supposed to produce. And we must recognize 
that many improvements to the human condition were in fact experienced by 
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populations that for too long suffered under oppressive governments throughout 
Africa, Latin America, India, China, and Eastern and Central Europe. The past 
two decades did see progress. But there were also many examples of frustration, 
backtracking, and regime failure over the past ten years as well.
So why the disjoint between the rhetoric and the reality in this era that prom-
ised so much to so many throughout the world? Each case would require detailed 
examination in a way that is beyond the scope of any one paper, let alone a book-
length treatment. Rather than promise something I cannot deliver, I will instead 
focus on what I consider to be an essential element in political and economic 
transitions of post communism—the establishment of a binding and credible 
commitment to liberal limits on state action. As I suggested earlier, without those 
liberal limits in place, democratic and economic transitions easily go astray and 
we end up with illiberal democracy and severely distorted and hampered market 
economies. The issue is not only solving a commitment problem, but also spec-
ifying the correct content to the commitment. In other words, what you are 
credibly committing to matters even more than whether you can commit to the 
policy rules required for reform. 
2. What Have We Learned Since The Collapse of Communism?
In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of communism in Eastern and 
Central Europe and then the break-up of the Soviet Union, the focus of economic 
reform was on “getting the prices right.” This phase lasted from roughly 1985 
to 1995.
During the last phase of state socialism, struggling economies in Poland, 
Hungary, and even the Soviet Union attempted economic reforms that sought to 
allow market prices and limited use of the profit motive to address the systemic 
stagnation in these countries. In Poland this took the form of decentralized 
administered pricing and bonuses for state enterprises; in Hungary, market 
socialist tinkering with the price system (in the attempt to realize efficiency) was 
introduced in the 1960s; and even in the former Soviet Union, Khrushchev’s 
“regionalism” and Gorbachev’s perestroika involved both price reform, decen-
tralization of decision-making, and limited introduction of the profit motive to 
provide incentives and mobilize the requisite information to allocate resources 
efficiently.
The experience in Hungary during the 1960s through the 1980s demonstrates 
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the failure of these limited price reforms to fix the fundamental economic prob-
lems with state socialism. Free pricing actually constituted a small part of the 
reforms as the goods and services in the economic system were divided into those 
subjected to fixed prices, limited prices, and free prices. The same sort of limited 
reforms were introduced with respect to state enterprises. State enterprises were 
given more control of decision-making and basic incentive compatibility in that 
success was measured in “profitability” of the enterprise, but they existed in a 
world of soft budget constraints and lacked the market discipline that would 
follow from competitive entry. So-called “goulash communism” was better than 
traditional socialism, but still paled in comparison to the market economy in 
terms of production efficiency and consumer satisfaction. The experience with 
perestroika in the Soviet Union is similar. Market reforms were introduced in the 
context of state socialism but the basic ownership structure of state socialism was 
left in place. So again, the reforms failed to produce what was required for the 
economic system to become more efficient.
The failure of perestroika highlights both points about credibility that was 
raised in the introduction. Gorbachev introduced during his relatively short time 
in office (1985–1991) at least ten “radical reforms” to improve the economic 
situation, only to have the reforms reversed within months of introduction. A 
major reason for the reform measures to result in frustration was that the reforms 
were incentive-incompatible with basic economics. Cooperatives, for example, 
were permitted to freely price, but those cooperatives that priced at market prices 
were taxed at a higher rate than those cooperatives that priced products at the 
state price. As a result (as the Russian joke went at the time) a state shortage of 
buns and a state shortage of sausage became a sandwich sold out the backdoor. 
In other words, while all acts between consenting capitalist adults were suppos-
edly freed under Gorbachev, economic actors in the Soviet Union still chose to 
transact in the black market rather than the newly legitimated above-ground 
market.
With the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe 
in 1989 and the former Soviet Union in 1991, the “getting the prices right” 
phase of reform began to be joined with a wide-scale recognition that prices exist 
within an institutional setting of private property and freedom of contract. In 
other words, the mantra of “getting the prices right” transformed into “getting 
the institutions right.” At a fundamental level this was a return to the main lesson 
of the socialist calculation debate that prices without property were a grand 
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illusion, as G. Warren Nutter put it. Privatization efforts throughout Eastern and 
Central Europe and the former Soviet Union swept through in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s with varying results, but mostly resulting in frustrations. Private 
property and freedom of contract it turned out required also a more funda-
mental institution—the rule of law. This led Milton Friedman to modify his 
advice to reforming countries from “privatize, privatize, privatize” to “privatize, 
privatize, privatize, provided there is a rule of law.” The “getting the institutions 
right” message evolved over the period from 1993 to 1999. Economists paid 
more attention to origins of legal systems and the relationship between funda-
mental legal and political institutions, the institutions of policy making, and 
exact economic policies. As economic thinkers devoted more attention to these 
questions, they were led to think about the transportability of institutions across 
countries and cultures.
After a decade of reforms in Eastern and Central Europe and the continued 
frustration with foreign aid programs in Africa, along with the apparent failure 
of “neo-liberalism” in Latin America, the consensus on free market policy started 
to fracture and economists started to search for answers to the lingering puzzle of 
failed reform, not in terms of the price system and public policy, but in deeper 
social structures that produced belief systems and bonds of trust. By 2000, rather 
than focusing exclusively on prices and formal institutions of governance and 
public policy, the intellectual agenda turned to “getting the culture right.” In the 
wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, questions of religion and 
cultural preconditions for democracy and the free market took on a new sense 
of urgency.
This evolution of thought from prices to institutions to culture should not be 
interpreted as superseding what was learned during the earlier stage. But instead 
the stages should be viewed as the outgrowth of delving deeper into the original 
question of how to get an economy on track to provide generalized prosperity to 
the people within that economy. Generalized prosperity cannot be had without 
a private property market economy, but such an economy cannot be established 
on a wide scale without a system of governance bound by general rules and strict 
limits established on state action, and a country cannot meaningfully institute 
general rules and strict limits unless the informal beliefs and institutions of the 
people in question legitimate those rules and limits. It is not, as Dani Rodrick 
seems to suggest, “one economics and many recipes” but rather “one economics, 
few recipes, and even fewer favorable conditions.” Transplanting the “good” rules 
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from successful countries to aid the failing countries is a more difficult task than 
either humanitarian peacekeepers or military adventurists ever imagined. In this 
negative sense, we just have another confirmation of Hayek’s (1988, 76) quip 
that “the curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they 
know about what they imagine they can design.”
Douglass North has argued that the general lesson we have learned from the 
post-communist experience (and the long march of human history toward polit-
ical freedom and economic progress) is that we must see beliefs that legitimate 
the ends of government; limits on the stakes of politics must be in place; property 
and personal rights must be defined; and credible and binding commitments to 
respect these rights must be established (2005, 107–108). Unless these condi-
tions are met, North argues, the transition from personal exchange to impersonal 
exchange relations will be thwarted and economic progress will be stunted. “The 
way in which beliefs  institutions  organizations  policies  outcomes 
evolves has led to unparalleled economic well-being and to endless disasters and 
human misery” (2005, 155).
To put this another way, Adam Smith argued that human beings have a 
natural propensity to truck, barter, and exchange, and it is this propensity that 
separates us from other animals. However, human history also demonstrates that 
we humans have a tremendous capacity to wreak havoc on one another—to rape, 
pillage and plunder. Progressive social change, which entails the movement from 
personal to impersonal exchange and the structuring of the economy and the 
polity as open access systems, depends on an intricate institutional matrix being 
in place. It is the institutions in operation as defined by the formal rules in place 
and the social norms that reside in the culture of the society, that ultimately will 
dictate whether the human propensity to “truck, barter, and exchange” domi-
nates the darker tendency to “rape, pillage, and plunder.” Human betterment 
follows from exchange, human misery from predation.
3. Social Cooperation under the Division of Labor
Understanding social change is made more complicated once we focus our 
attention on the issue of the transition from personal to impersonal exchange 
and what that entails for progress. To put it bluntly, we cannot have economic 
progress while mired in personal exchange networks. Expansion of the economic 
well-being of humanity requires that impersonal exchange is not only made 
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possible but defines our daily existence. As Adam Smith famously put it, we 
stand in need of the cooperation of a great multitude of others for our daily 
survival, yet in a lifetime we have but the time to make a few close personal 
friends. How then are we to prevail against nature “red in tooth and claw” as 
frail human creatures? It is not from benevolence that we can expect our daily 
sustenance, the clothes on our back, or the roof over our heads. It is through 
channeling self-love, through exchange and the desire to profit. The butcher, the 
baker, and the brewer provide us with our dinner, Smith taught, not due to their 
benevolence, but with regard to their self-interest.
Early on in The Wealth of Nations, Smith actually uses the example of a 
common woolen coat on the back of a day laborer to communicate to his readers 
both the complex interdependency of exchange and production and the anon-
ymous nature of the cooperation that must be achieved even to produce the 
most common products we enjoy. Explaining the emergence of this extended 
social cooperation under the division of labor represents the central mystery of 
economics, whether we are talking about woolen coats, or pencils, or automo-
biles, or computers. Advances in the well-being of humanity require extending 
specialization and exchange, and realizing those gains from trade requires 
both the coordination of disparate activities and the cooperation of hundreds, 
sometimes thousands, perhaps millions of individuals spread around the globe 
who will never be able to put a name or face to others in the intricate chain of 
economic activities yet will do their part day in and day out so that the chain is 
uninterrupted.
The threat to this smooth process of realizing the gains from specialization 
and exchange is predation. Let me distinguish between first-level and second-
level predation. By first-level predation I mean the threat of predation by private 
actors, whereas by second-level predation I mean the threat of predation by 
public actors. The dilemma is that we create second-level predation only because 
of the way we attempt to deal with first-level predation. In our attempt to solve 
the problem of private predation through public means, we create the problem 
of public predation.
Private solutions to private predation rely on the self-regulating capacity 
of actors. The most common mechanisms of self-regulation are reputation and 
punishment. In standard treatments, these mechanisms are said to be effective 
only in small group settings with homogenous agents. But in such a group, the 
gains from exchange are limited only to the span of personal exchange networks 
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as the gains from specialization and exchange to be had by interaction with anon-
ymous others would be too vulnerable to predation without any recourse to be 
justified. To realize those gains from specialization and exchange, the theory goes, 
we establish institutions of governance and third-party enforcement of contracts. 
In most presentations, these institutions are identified with the establishment of 
the state—a geographic monopoly on the use of coercion. But once the state has 
been established to provide third-party enforcement so that anonymous exchange 
relations can be realized and the gains from trade and innovation can produce 
wealth and economic growth, the opportunity for confiscation of that wealth by 
public officials presents itself. The opportunism of public actors in their effort 
to profit through predation must be curtailed. It is this dilemma that led North 
(1981) to conclude that the state is both the source of economic development 
and the greatest threat to economic development.
4. Credible Commitment and the Paradox of Government
“The key to political order,” North (2005, 107) writes, “is the establishment 
of credible bounds on the behavior of political officials.” Private predation that 
is unabated may thwart economic progress by curtailing the progression from 
personal exchange networks to the extended order of impersonal exchange and 
realizing the gains from specialization, exchange, and social cooperation under 
the division of labor. But public predation has the potential to destroy an other-
wise healthy and wealthy economy. To put it another way, if the discipline of 
economics is to explain the wealth and poverty of nations, then the explanation 
is to be found not in geography or in natural resource abundance or even in the 
character of the people, but instead in the fundamental institutions of gover-
nance that curb the predatory proclivities of man.
If we successfully limit predation between private actors, then the gains from 
exchange and the gains from innovation are powerful enough to put any country 
on the path to prosperity. If we fail to limit the predatory behavior of public 
actors, even the most advantaged country in terms of location, resources and 
people will be mired in poverty and squalor. But, if, and only if, we are successful 
 Just a note of clarification, this does translate into specific public policies as well—inflation is 
confiscatory, so a regime that sought to curb predation would fight against inflation, and a similar 
story could be told about taxation, public debt, regulation, and restrictions on foreign trade.
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at establishing limits on private and public predation, then the creative powers of 
the citizens in that society will generate unimagined economic wealth and better-
ment of the human condition.
Establishing those limits on state action in a binding and credible way 
requires a level of constitutional craftsmanship and institutional innovative-
ness that has proven elusive in human history. The paradox of government has 
been recognized through the political history of liberalism. A government strong 
enough to establish a constitution is almost by definition strong enough to break 
the constitutional bindings anytime it desires for political expediency. The tying 
of the rulers’ hands in politics appears to be much more difficult than Homer’s 
depiction of tying Ulysses to the mast and putting wax in his sailors ears so he 
could both hear the call of the Sirens yet successfully navigate the passage without 
destroying the ship. The parable of Ulysses and the Sirens does capture the self-
constraining behavior that is required, but in the world of politics Ulysses is also 
always left in possession of a knife in his hands to cut through the rope.
But in addition to the problem of credibly binding the rulers’ hands, in the 
transition and developing countries context, the rulers must also signal specific 
content to the actors in the economy who have experienced public predation by 
the state far greater than the private predation the state was created to ward off. In 
the former Soviet Union, for example, the citizens had in fact heard many times 
before that reforms were being introduced that would grant them more freedom 
in economic and political life, only to have those promises broken almost as soon 
as they were uttered. Russian citizens referred to the “Big Lie” to describe the 
relationships between the citizen and the state. So rulers must not only establish 
credible bounds on their behavior, they must do so in a manner that credibly 
signals to citizens that this time they will keep their promise.
Credible commitments to curb predation are more likely to be established 
in high trust societies. In low trust societies, the societies that are struggling to 
realize the gains from trade and gains from innovation precisely because of the 
prevalence of predation, will have the most difficult time establishing credible 
commitments and signaling the content of that commitment in a way that solicits 
confidence that promises will be kept. Constitutions understood to be written 
figuratively on a word processor, for example, are not very effective constitutions. 
Neither were ones written on parchment, unless they were written on hearts and 
minds first.
So we have now come back again to beliefs and their role in easing the 
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establishment of credible commitments. Binding constitutions are self-sustaining 
constitutions, and the self-sustaining characteristic is a function both of insti-
tutional craftsmanship and underlying beliefs. A free society works best when 
the need for the policemen is least. This statement is true because it is literally 
impossible to monitor every social transaction in a modern society. Most social 
intercourse goes on unaffected by cheating because the parties to the intercourse 
never consider doing the opportunistic act due to internal norms. In doing so, 
they lower the costs of enforcing the general rule of promise keeping. Work at 
the cutting edge of political economy from development economics to regula-
tory studies is examining this relationship between high and low trust societies 
and the effectiveness of regulation. The main lesson to be drawn so far from this 
literature is that in high trust societies, self-regulation is already in operation so 
state regulation is redundant at best, and in low trust societies, where one might 
argue that regulation is needed more, there are difficulties with getting state regu-
lations to work.
To sum up what we have argued: in order to realize the great benefits of social 
cooperation under the division of labor, credible commitments that bound the 
behavior of public officials must be established; this binding of government must 
be done in a way that signals to citizens that promises made will be kept; and 
finally, the constitution being put in place must be self-sustaining both in terms 
of its institutional design and with respect to its consistency with the underlying 
belief system in that society. 
5. Conclusion
The classical political economists emphasized that the source of social order 
was to be found in the stability of possession, transference by consent, and the 
keeping of promises (e.g., Hume). Smith referred to this set of institutional 
arrangements as the “system of natural liberty,” and he often emphasized that 
deviations from that system would not only fail to bring wealth to nations but 
also could only be supported by tyrannical means. In the twentieth century, F. 
A. Hayek sought to restate the classical political economist argument for his age. 
Hayek emphasized the need to craft a constitutional order where bad men can do 
the least harm, and to do that, the task of the political economist was to discover 
the set of institutions that induce men to cooperate through their own interest 
and with respect to their own limited cognitive abilities.
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Among political economists still working into the twenty-first century, 
Douglass North has probably done more than any of his peers to put institutions 
and ideology in the forefront of the research community in economics, politics, 
and the social sciences. A nice summary statement of his position is found in 
his essay on “The Chinese Model of Development,” where he states, “The way 
the game is actually played is a function of the underlying intentions embodied 
in the rules, the strength of informal codes of conduct, the perception of the 
umpires, and the severity of the punishment for violating rules.” Let me add that 
we have learned as well from Douglass North that progressive social change is 
not only about the shift in the rules, but also about the content of those rules to 
limit the predatory proclivities of man, which are nowhere as dangerous as in the 
geographic monopoly of coercion known as the state.
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